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'DEC,OLONJ,ZING' PUERTO RICO, 
U.S. STYLE 
PEDRO A. CABAN, Ph.D. 
If the United States Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources has its way, Puerto 
Rico's political status may finally be 
resolved by the end of 1991. 
Congressional committees, an Executive 
Branch task force, the leadership of 
Puerto Rico's established political parties 
and dozens of law firms and professional 
lobbyists will be engaged in heated 
negotiations for the next year in a process 
that may result in a referendmn on the 
three status options: Statehood, Indepen-
dence or "Enhanced Commonwealth." The 
proposed Puerto Rican Status Referendmn 
Act (U.S. Senate Bill S-712), co-sponsored 
by Senators Bennett Johnston 
(Democrat-Louisiana) and James McClure 
(Republican-Idaho), provides for .the 
referendmn to be held in Puerto Rico on 
June 4, 1991. 
continued on page 7 ... 
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'DECOLONIZING' PUERTO RICO, U.S. SlYLE 
Pedro A. Caban 
(continued from cover) 
It was on January 17, 1989 that leaders of Puerto 
Rico's three electoral parties signed an historic 
statement calling on President George W. Bush to 
begin a process to resolve Puerto Rico's troubled 
political status.1 The event was unusual for three 
reasons: 
.f:ml. during his reelection campaign, Puerto Rico 
Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon assured the 
country that, if elected, his Administration would 
concentrate on addressing Puerto Rico's serious social 
and economic problems and not seek to alter the 
Island's political status. But, to the surprise of many 
political observers, the Governor, in his inaugural 
address in January 1989, called for a plebiscite to be 
held during his tenure. 
Second. the three major parties issued a statement 
that "since Puerto Rico came under the sovereignty of 
the United States of America, under the terms of the 
Treaty of Paris in 1898, the people of Puerto Rico 
have not been formaUy consulted by the United States 
of America as to its preference on the final political 
status . ..2 (author's translation from the Spanish) The 
phrase was significant; for the first time the 
pro-commonwealth Partido Popular Democratico 
(PPD) publicly declared that the Commonwealth is 
not a compact of free association by two sovereign 
peoples.3 
.Third. while each political party has tried individually 
to persuade the U.S. government to initiate a consulta 
on Puerto Rico's political status, their January 
statement was the first joint public call for the U.S. 
government to do so. Barely six months later, the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources drafted three status-related bills that would 
permit the people of Puerto Rico to choose among 
the three status options. 
Why a Referendum Now? 
The speed with which these events have unfolded, 
after nearly four decades of U.S. inaction on the status 
of Puerto Rico, leaves little doubt that the joint 
statement of January 17, 1989 was encouraged, if not 
actually proposed, by Washington. Qaridad, the 
newspaper of the pro-independence Partido Socialista 
Puertorriqueiio (PSP), reported that the Bush 
Administration was prepared to hold a referendum on 
the status issue soon after the President's 
inauguration. On January 1, 1989, Andrew Card, 
White House Deputy Chief of Staff, informed 
Hernandez Colon that he had instructions from 
President Bush to announce the Administration's 
intention to "present a proposal for consultations on 
the status issue." Card gave Hernandez Colon the 
option of calling for a referendum.4 
The U.S. federal government's decision to authorize 
the referendum appears to have been the product of 
more than a decade of internal discussions and policy 
reviews on the problem of Puerto Rico's status at the 
highest levels of the Executive Branch.5 The Carter 
Administration was cautiously moving toward 
proposing a plebiscite on the Island's future status, 
with independence as a viable option.6 Since the late 
1970s, numerous studies on the subject have been 
published by think tanks, research centers and 
government agencies? Despite this flurry of 
intellectual activity, the Reagan Administration did not 
promote status change. Whatever the reasons for this 
notable inactivity during the Reagan years, President 
Bush's decision to act seems to have been the 
outcome of a process that has been percolating for 
over a decade. When the 10lst Congress convened 
in January 1989, Senator Bennett Johnston and the 
Bush Administration were prepared to move quickly 
on the referendum. 
The question that everyone is asking is why the U.S. 
government chose this moment in time to initiate the 
referendum process. Juan Manuel Garcia Passalacqua, 
the well-known Puerto Rican political commentator, 
has for years been telling Puerto Ricans that 
Washington believes the huge financial costs of 
keeping the colony are unacceptable. By the 
mid-1980s, these policy makers, he reports, were 
discussing how to ease Puerto Rico toward 
independence.8 The problem of skyrocketing budget 
deficits, which dominated much of the 1988 
presidential campaign, provided the necessary context 
for the Bush Administration to initiate the referendum 
process. 
Ruben Berrios Martinez, President of the 
pro-independence Partido lndependentista 
Puertorriqueno (PIP) considered the following reason 
decisive: 
Since the end of the Second World War, 
fundamental changes have occurred at the 
international level that require important internal 
adjustments to the North American economy and 
demand new directions in the foreign policy of 
that nation to adapt to the present global 
economy and new geo-political realities.9 (author's 
translation) 
Others have argued that the timing of the referendum 
was in reaction to the meeting of the UN 
Decolonization Committee (the so-called "Committee 
of 24") that has considered the question of Puerto 
Rico's colonial status annually for the last decade. 
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The U.S. Senate Committee worked feverishly to 
conclude the hearings and drafted the referendum bill 
before the Committee of 24 met on August 16 and 17, 
1989. By including the independence option in S.712, 
the Bush Administration hoped to persuade the 
Committee of 24 that the referendum process 
conformed to international law and to not take up the 
matter of Puerto Rico. 
Another factor that may help to explain the timing of 
the referendum initiative is the decision by U.S. 
strategic planners to promote a more comprehensive 
geo-political and economic strategy for the Caribbean 
that requires a "redefinition" of Puerto Rico's status 
and role in the region. In a ViUage Voice article, Ed 
Morales pointedly observed: "As the priorities of U.S. 
military power shift from the cold war to the drug 
war, and as Ronald Reagan's Caribbean Basin 
Initiative ... works to prevent the reemergence of mixed 
economies like Michael Manley's Jamaica and 
Maurice Bishop's Grenada. a reassessment of Puerto 
Rico's status now seems overdue."10 
Manuel Casiano, publisher of the influential Caribbean 
Business, a weekly based in Puerto Rico, says the 
referendum was strictly Hernandez Colon's idea. He 
argues that the Governor wanted a referendum on the 
status issue because his extremely narrow margin of 
victory in the last gubernatorial elections made him 
vulnerable, and he wanted to "stop the statehood p~ 
once and for all before the next election."1 
According to this view, Hernandez Colon felt that the 
political climate was propitious to obtain 
Congressional support for some changes in the 
Commonwealth formula. which would ultimately 
benefit his Administration. Casiano is echoing doubts 
that the Bush Administration wanted to move on the 
status issue at this time, a theory that enjoys 
considerable support in some independence circles. 
The U.S. Senate Hearings 
Whatever the reasoning behind the Bush 
Administration's decision to proceed in January 1989 
with its "decolonization process," it was ready to 
quickly put into place an agenda for change. The first 
set of exploratory talks with the presidents of the 
Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), the Partido 
Popular Democratico (PPD), and the pro-statehood 
Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP), took place during 
the last week of February 1989. Party platforms and 
conditions for participating in the referendum, the 
procedures for conducting the consulta and a 
preliminary timetable for the referendum were 
arranged at these meetings.12 Each representative 
agreed to provide proposals to the Senate Committee 
on their respective party's status options, the so-called 
"wish lists," to be included in the Committee's draft 
legislation. 
Three sets of hearings were initially scheduled. The 
first hearings were held in early June 1989 in 
Washington, D.C., and were limited to testimony from 
the Island's three electoral political parties. This was 
followed by another set of hearings in San Juan in 
mid-June, limited to individuals and organizations 
invited by the Senate Committee. The third set of 
hearings was scheduled again in Washington in early 
July to hear the Bush Administration's reaction to the 
status proposals. 
June I and 2, 1989 Hearings: Capitol Hill 
In his opening statement, Senator Johnston cautioned 
that the effects of any status change would have to be 
revenue neutral, meaning the U.S. government would 
not approve status proposals that increased the federal 
deficit. He drew attention to "the harsh fiscal reality 
facing Congress" that would "make budget 'neutrality' 
an objective during its consideration." If a status 
"definition includes an increased benefit," Johnston 
pointed out, "then Congress will be looking for a way 
to offset the cost of that benefit."13 
Johnston assured the Island's representatives that it 
was Congress' intention to respect the wishes of the 
people of Puerto Rico and abide by the referendum 
results. Once the S.712 referendum results are 
ratified, the preferred option would go into effect 
without further Congressional action - the so-called 
"self-executing" provisions of the bill. 
During the hearings in Washington, each proposal 
submitted by the political parties in Puerto Rico was 
scrutinized and challenged by the U.S. Senate 
Committee. Briefly, virtually all of the elements 
included in the PPD proposal for "enhanced 
commonwealth" were deemed unacceptable by the 
Committee. Senators Johnston and McOure rejected 
any changes in existing legislation that implied a 
diminution or constraint in the exercise of 
congressional and executive branch powers over 
Puerto Rico. 
The U.S. Senate Committee expressed serious 
reservations with the pro-statehood position that 
Spanish be recognized as the official language of 
Puerto Rico. It also cautioned statehood forces 
against expecting immediate and sizable increases in 
federal transfer payments without a concurrent 
phasing-in of federal taxes. 
In response to the PIP's proposal for the 
demilitarization of Puerto Rico, Johnston and 
McOure insisted that the U.S. would not relinquish its 
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military bases. The PIP recognized the security 
interests of the United States and agreed that the 
issue of the military bases was negotiable. All the 
parties called for retention or lengthy phase-out of 
section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code.14 
June 16, 17 and 19 Hearings: San Juan 
In its hearings conducted in Puerto Rico, the U.S. 
Senate Committee explicitly rejected United Nations 
jurisdiction over the referendum. The U.S. Senators 
argued that by acceding to the PIP's condition for the 
transference of sovereign powers if independence is 
the preferred status, the U.S. had complied with the 
requirements of international law on the right of 
self-determination. This position was challenged by 
the PIP, who maintained that all three status formulas 
must provide for the transfer of sovereignty in order 
to comply with the UN resolution on decolonization. 
In Puerto Rico, Senator Johnston was decidedly more 
conciliatory to the commonwealth and statehood 
proposals. The concept of Spanish as the official 
language for Puerto Rico was not expressly rejected 
and was left for future negotiation. The PPD was 
assured that the U.S. was sensitive to the needs of the 
Commonwealth government to have some input in 
assessing the domestic impact of federal legislation. 
These hearings allowed a wider cross section of 
political and social forces to express their views on the 
proposed referendum. Carlos Gallisa, President of the 
Puerto Rican Socialist Party, provided one of the most 
dramatic moments in the hearings when he challenged 
the legitimacy of the referendum process Congress 
had devised. Gallisa called on the U.S. Senate 
Committee to recognize Puerto Rico's colonial status 
and argued that "this is of primary importance because 
if you disavow the nature of the problem, that Puerto 
Rico is a colony, then nothing will be solved by the 
hearings; we would be repeating the futile exercise of 
1967 and would be holding the same mockery of a 
plebiscite."15 
Witnesses from different political sectors called for the 
Senate Committee to comply with international law in 
drafting the referendum bill. Gallisa called upon 
Congress to comply with resolution 1514 (XV), which 
he referred to as the "Magna Carta of 
Decolonization. • Nora Matias Rodriguez, President of 
the Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, asked that 
U.S. Senate Bill 712 be amended to provide for a 
constituent assembly that would draw up an alternate 
proposal conforming to internationally accepted 
standards of self-determination. She called upon the 
U.S. government to "renounce all power and authority 
exerted over Puerto Rico, transferring [it] to the 
people of Puerto Rico in an unconditional manner and 
with no reservations." She warned that "the process of 
decolonization should be carried out free of any ... 
interference by colonial powers."16 
July 11, 13 and 14: Back on Capitol Hill 
The hearings held in Washington gave the Bush 
Administration an opportunity to present its reactions 
to the three status formulas. Serious reservations 
were expressed about each of the options, although 
Administration representatives reaffirmed President 
Bush's preference for statehood. 
Virtually all the elements of the "enhanced 
commonwealth" proposal were challenged. State 
Department representative Mary V. Mochary argued 
that the enhanced commonwealth proposal would 
create an unprecedented political status and "would 
grant to Puerto Rico significant attributes of 
sovereignty which would be incompatible with 
remaining part of the United States." The 
Department, she declared, objected to delegating 
Puerto Rico authority vested in the Executive Branch 
by the U.S. Constitution and the PPD's proposal for 
Puerto Rico to enter into international agreements 
was "most objectionable." She testified that as 1ong 
as Puerto Rico enjoys a status less than that of 
independence," it could not gain greater freedom to 
participate in international organizations than it is 
currently permitted.17 The Bush Administration 
reaffirmed the U.S. Senate Committee's opposition to 
"enhanced commonwealth." 
The Bush Administration reacted most favorably to 
the statehood proposal, and its officials repeatedly 
noted the statehood option posed the least difficulty 
with respect to the issues of concern to the Executive 
Branch. Nonetheless, objections were raised to 
proposals for the use of Spanish in the U.S. District 
Court, the matter of excise taxes, tariffs on imported 
coffee, the 200-mile jurisdiction of territorial waters, 
and the provision for Congress to enact an omnibus 
bill to "ensure that the people of Puerto Rico attain 
equal social and economic opportunities with the 
residents of the several states." Despite these 
concerns, the statehood proposal received a very 
favorable review by the Bush Administration, which 
chose not to raise explicit objections to re~g 
Spanish as an official language of Puerto Rico. 8 
While the Administration was not dismissive toward 
the PIP proposal, it left little doubt that a 
demilitarized Puerto Rico was unacceptable. 
Brigadier General MJ. Byron asserted in his 
testimony that, "the Department of Defense considers 
Puerto Rico as a strategic pivot point of major 
importance to U.S. national security .. ." and strongly 
recommended that the seven military installations in 
9 
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Puerto Rico (including the huge Roosevelt Roads 
complex) be retained. 
Although he did not categorically reject the PIP's 
request for the U.S. to recognize "the right of the 
people of Puerto Rico to strive toward the total 
demilitarization of its territory,· Byron cautioned that 
such a policy would involve degradation of U.S. 
military capabilities and impose enormous financial 
costs on the federal government.19 U.S. State 
Department representative Mochary was more blunt 
in her testimony, stating that, "Owing to the strategic 
importance of existing military installations and 
operations in Puerto Rico," the provision calling for 
the Republic of Puerto Rico to close its territory to 
any and all military forces of foreign nations was 
"directly at odds with U.S global military interests . ..20 
But, it was Senator Johnston who got to the core of 
the issue when he admonished: "We must ensure in an 
independence situation ... that Puerto Rico would not 
become a Soviet base or a Cuban base . ..21 
Dynamics of the Senate Bill 
The U.S. Senate Committee revised each of the three 
proposals and approved S.712 by a slim margin of 
eight to eleven on August 8, 1989.22 Legislative 
activity, however, has been unusually slow and marred 
by frequent claims that the PPD is relying on its allies 
in the U .S. Congress to derail the status legislation. 
Senator Johnston has been visibly annoyed at the Bush 
Administration's laggard response to his request for 
reports and position papers, and with the seeming 
procrastination by its interagency task force to exercise 
leadership in the referendwn process. Serious 
Congressional divisions on key provisions of S.712 
threaten to scuttle the referendum. 
The Legislative Process 
S.712 was submitted to the U.S. Senate F'mance 
Committee, chaired by Senator Lloyd Bentsen 
(Dem.-Texas), the 1988 Democratic candidate for 
Vice-President. But the Fmance Committee waited 
until November 15, 1989 to hold hearings on the 
revenue and expenditure effects of S.712. Puerto 
Rico's political party leaders essentially reaffirmed the 
economic provisions of their original proposals. The 
Finance Committee may hold an additional hearing 
before drafting a revised version of S.712. 
Despite pressure from Senator Johnston, Ron de Lugo 
(Dem.), Delegate to the U.S. Congress for the Virgin 
Islands, who chairs the U.S. House Insular and 
International Affairs Subcommittee that has 
jurisdiction on the referendwn, failed to introduce 
legislation in 1989. De Lugo has held hearings in 1990 
thus far in Washington, DC, Puerto Rico and 
announced that he will hold one in New York City. 
He also observed that the referendum bill was bogged 
down in the U.S. Senate. Assuming that the 
Subcommittee does introduce a bill, it is expected to 
differ significantly from S.712. A conference 
committee will have the difficult task of writing a 
compromise measure before submitting the revised 
bill to the full Congress for a vote. 
Congressman Ronald Dellums (Dem.-California) 
introduced a House Joint Resolution "to submit to the 
Puerto Rican electorate in a referendum ... the offer of 
full empowerment to a Constitutional Assembly 
elected by the people of Puerto Rico ... " The resolution 
calls for the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico, and 
not the U.S. Congress, to conduct the referendwn. It 
requires the Legislature to "guarantee the proportional 
representation of all political parties and independent 
slates that.,8resent canctidates to the Constitutional 
Assembly. The resolution is an attempt to be 
consistent with the principle of self-determination as 
specified in the UN resolution 1514 (XV) and concurs 
with the Colegio de Abogados de fueno Rico's position 
on decolonization. The Dellums resolution has been 
bottlenecked in the U.S. House Subcommittee on 
International Economic Development and Trade since 
April 4, 1989. 
Self-Executing Provisions 
The self-executing provision of S.712 is the most 
troublesome feature of the bill for Congress. 
According to this provision, the status option that 
obtains a simple majority of the Island vote will 
automatically go into effect within a period specified 
in the legislation, with no further congressional action 
required. 24 Immediately after the bill was approved 
by the Johnston Committee, House Speaker Thomas 
Foley (Dem.-Washington) questioned whether 
Congress can commit itself to a prospective act that 
accepts the referendum results as bincting upon their 
certification, "rather than a two-stage process where 
we hear the results of the Puerto Rican plebiscite and 
then commit ourselves ... to reflecting those wishes in 
legislation . ..25 
The U.S. House leadership announced it would not 
introduce S.712 because of its self-executing provision. 
Virgin Islands Delegate de Lugo insisted that the 
three Puerto Rican political parties drop the provision 
as a condition for his Committee to introduce a House 
referendurri. status bill. However, because of intense 
opposition by the PNP, he may decide to permit each 
of the parties to submit its own bill. But, he is 
insistent that "self-execution doesn't have a chance . ..26 
This development did not surprise Ruben Berrios, 
who has maintained all along that the provision would 
commit Congress to granting Puerto Rico statehood 
if its people chose this option, something he is certain 
Congress will not permit. 
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Eliminating the self-executing provts1on raises the 
obvious concern that the U.S. government could seek 
further changes and impose additional conditions 
before certifying the status option chosen by the 
Puerto Rican people. To include a requirement that 
Congress should not legally commit itself to 
automatically accept the referendum results would 
appear to violate the clause in S.712 that stipulates 
the U.S. "recognizes the principle of self determination 
and other applicable principles of international law 
with respect to Puerto Rico." The Puerto Rican 
political party leaders contend that without Congress' 
prior commitment to accept all the provisions of the 
winning o.ption, the plebiscite would be a mere "beauty 
contest...2 
Costs of Status Otange 
Puerto Rican independence and commonwealth 
advocates, as well as some members of Congress, 
contend that S.712 is unbalanced because it "front 
loads" or gives more economic advantages to the 
statehood option. Hernandez Colon insists that by 
providing for a marked increase in benefits to 
impoverished Puerto Ricans once the Island becomes 
a state, the pro-statehood PNP's prospects for victory 
are significantly enhanced. In an arrant attempt to 
counter this bias in the bill, Governor Hernandez 
Colon pleaded before the Senate Finance Committee 
for an additional $2 billion in increased federal 
transfer payments for the enhanced commonwealth 
proposal. A San Juan Star article in November 1989, 
reported that 
Rubin Berrios, President of the Puerto Rican 
Independence Party, was particularly vehement, 
warning Congress against giving Puerto Rico 
residents "a cornucopia of (federal funds) if they 
vote for the present status of political 
subordination. • 
The Report submitted with bill S.712 addresses this 
issue: 
Specifically, concerns were raised that there is a 
tilt toward statehood because there are a number 
of programs (Food Stamps, Medicaid, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children) on which. 
effective January 1, 1992, the existing Federal 
"caps" on benefits would be eliminated and 
recipients of these program benefits might thus be 
encouraged to vote for statehood ... The 
Committee's action should not be interpreted as 
an endorsement of Puerto Rico's present 
treatment, but simply a recognition that such 
treatment would not be Constitutionally 
permissible under Statehood.28 
Ironically, it is uncertainty about the costs to the U.S. 
government that caused a number of Senators to vote 
against S.712. U.S. Senator Kent Conrad (Dem.-
North Dakota), who voted against the measure, 
thought the Committee lacked sufficient information 
on the fiscal impact of statehood and worried "that the 
budgetary implications of this measure are large, and 
the federal budget deficit is too big for the Committee 
to rely on imprecise numbers . ..29 
To counter these misgivings, Carlos Romero Barcelo 
(PNP) argued that, 'The only way to reduce this 
deficit is through statehood and bringing the U.S. 
citizens of Puerto Rico into the federal income tax 
system." He noted that only statehood would provide 
the "federal government with a positive revenue 
flow . ..lO 
Yet, a Congressional Budget Office report, released 
on November 2, 1989, estimates federal payments for 
all entitlement programs would increase substantially 
under statehood. Federal average monthly adult public 
assistance payments are currently capped at $32, and 
are expected to jump to $.360 if Puerto Rico becomes 
a state. In addition, total federal costs were estimated 
at $9.3 billion for the four-year transition period 
before Puerto Rico is absorbed into the federal tax 
system. Committee member Senator Malcolm Wallop 
(Rep.-Wyoming) reacted that S.712, " ... misleads the 
people of Puerto Rico by inducing beneficiaries of 
various programs to vote for statehood in order to 
obtain immediate increases in welfare benefits--- even 
though within a few years the loss of the special tax 
programs could mean a massive 1~ of jobs and 
greater impoverishment of the Island. 1 
The Future of Section 936 
As has been already pointed out, economic 
considerations have been at the center of the public 
hearings and negotiations on the proposed 
referendum. In particular, the future of Section 936 
has transfiXed the Puerto Rican leadership, the U.S. 
Senate Committee and the Bush Administration. 
Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code is a 
complex fiscal measure that essentially permits U.S. 
corporations with subsidiary branches in Puerto Rico 
to repatriate earnings derived from these operations 
without paying taxes to the federal government. 
Section 936, when combined with the generous 
industrial incentives, including tax exemptions and low 
wages provided by the Commonwealth government 
and Puerto Rican labor, has converted the Island into 
an incredibly profitable investment site for 
international conglomerates. In the pedestrian words 
of Treasury official Kenneth Gideon, "Because Puerto 
Rican tax law provides generous exemptions to certain 
business operations there, Section 936 corporations 
enjoy a low aggregate effective tax rate . ..32 
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Why did the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) 
call for a twenty-five year phase-out of Section 936 
instead of its elimination 7 Simply · put, because the 
multinational corporations that migrate to Puerto Rico 
are the mainstay of the economy. These multinational 
corporations are primarily in the pharmaceutical, 
scientific instruments and electronics sectors; however, 
labor-intensive textile and apparel industries also 
benefit from Section 936 tax credits. According to a 
recent report by the Puerto Rico, U.SA. Foundation 
(a lobbying organization in Washington representing 
more than 70 corporations with operations in Puerto 
Rico), approximately one-third of the Island's 
employment is directly or indirectly related to these 
936 corporations.33 
Moreover, these corporations are crucial to the Puerto 
Rican financial sector. Funds deposited by Section 936 
corporations account for approximately 41% of the 
commercial bank deposits on the Island.34 Loans 
financed by these deposits are expended for mortgages 
and government development projects, and thus 
furnish capital to the vitally important and 
locally-owned construction industries. 
In reality, Puerto Rico's economy is excessively 
dependent on Section 936, a provisional fiscal 
mechanism that was devised by Congress and is 
subject to its review and cancellation. Because these 
corporations are crucial to the economy, any 
phase-out of the Section 936 credit will result in major 
dislocations for the Puerto Rican people. Given this, 
it is not surprising that the leadership of all the 
Island's political parties aggressively petitioned 
Congress and the Bush Administration to retain, or 
failing this, to agree to a slow and gradual phase-out 
of Section 936. 
The U.S. government is acutely aware of the 
significance of Section 936 tax credits to employment 
and investment on the Island. According to U.S. 
Treasury official Kenneth Gideon, "a phase-out of 
Section 936 would cause economic dislocation in 
Puerto Rico," and will result in many firms leaving the 
lsland.35 Nonetheless, since 1976 the U.S. Treasury 
Department has attempted to persuade Congress to 
rescind the Section 936 tax credit as a way of reducing 
the federal deficit. 
Although defeated by monumental lobbying efforts in 
1976 and 1985, the Treasury has, with its 
revenue-enhancing allies in Congress, systematically 
chipped away at Section 936 and diminished its 
profit-enhancing value. In its annual reports on the 
"possessions corporation system of taxation," the 
Treasury argues that Section 936 is a giveaway for the 
multinational corporations and that the U.S. Treasury 
foregoes billions of dollars in lost revenue as a 
result.36 
The referendum bill provided the U.S. Treasury 
Department an opportunity to advance its goal of 
eliminating Section 936. Treasury apparently 
persuaded Senator Johnston that provisions for an 
accelerated phase-out of Section 936 benefits should 
be included in the statehood and independence 
options.37 In the hearings in Puerto Rico, Senator 
Johnston was most insistent that the provision for a 
twenty-five year phase-out (which all the parties 
supported) was unacceptable. He demurred that, "The 
desire in eliminating the 936 funds is because people 
think that it is an expense for the Treasury of the 
United States." 38 (author's translation) Johnston also 
concluded that, 
It is a problem of having your cake and eating it 
too. You see, each of the three statuses has stated 
its wish list of what they want. And each wants 
all aspects ··· I mean the statehooders want all 
the benefits of commonwealth, Section 936 and 
all the goodies. Independents, they want all of the 
obligations that the United States has assumed 
toward Puerto Rico.39 
While Section 936 is seen in Washington as a form of 
subsidy for Puerto Rico detrimental to the federal 
treasury, in reality Section 936 is a subsidy for U.S. 
multinational corporations. The 936 corporations are 
criticized for transfering their overseas profits to 
Puerto Rico and claiming them as income derived 
from their subsidiary operations in the Island. Most 
observers feel the fate of Section 936 will be 
determined by the U.S. Senate Finance Committee 
that is expected to submit a revised referendum bill 
sometime in 1990. This committee will no doubt be 
barraged by the Puerto Rico, U.SA. Foundation, the 
leadership of the Puerto Rican political parties, and 
their congressional allies, all of whom will demand 
more generous phase-out arrangements for Section 
936. 
The Bottom Line 
Jibaro Statehood Impossible 
As stated earlier, the pro-statehood PNP obtained 
U.S. Senate Committee approval for most of its 
proposals, although in modified form. S.712 retains 
the current favorable tax treatment until January 1, 
1994 and requires a five-year phase-out of Section 936. 
Federal transfer payments would increase immediately 
upon certification as a State of the Union because 
Puerto Rico would receive equal treatment under the 
Constitution. 
But the PNP lost on the crucial issue of U.S. 
"guarantees" to preserve Puerto Rico's language and 
cultural traditions. The U.S. Senate Committee 
rejected the sections recognizing Spanish and English 
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as official state languages, and Puerto Rico's " ... right 
to preserve and enhance its rich Hispanic culture.040 
In reaction. Rodriguez Matias of the Cclegio de 
Abogados declared before the UN Committee of 24 
that, '"This violates the fundamental right of any 
people to maintain its individuality and cultural 
characteristics."' 1 
The PNP, which has always been vulnerable to the 
charge that statehood would result in the destruction 
of Puerto Rico's unique cultural attributes, had clearly 
included these provisions to assuage voter anxiety. 
Gerda Bikales, founding member of the "U.S. 
English" movement, revived this apprehension when 
she testified before the U.S. Senate Committee that it 
was incumbent upon Congress to include provisions in 
the bill for informing Puerto Ricans "that statehood 
implies a transiti~n to English as the official language 
of govemmenL"' In the March 2, 1990 hearing of the 
U.S. House Subcommittee on Insular and 
International Affairs in Washington, DC, Romero 
Barcelo testified that the PNP would no longer insist 
on Spanish as the official lanaguge of Puerto Rico 
under statehood. He concluded that current U .S.la'WS 
on freedom of speech guarantee that the use of 
Spanish under statehood would be protected for local 
matters.43 
A Diluted Enhanced Commonwealth 
The U .S. Senate Committee rejected 17 of the 20 
provisions in the PPD's proposal for "enhanced 
commonwealth." In fact, the Committee concluded, 
"H enhanced commonwealth is certified, the 
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United 
States remains essentially the same . ..44 Senator 
Johnston objected to the section of the PPD's 
statement of purposes that referred to the Puerto 
Rican people as having "adopted in their own 
sovereign right their own Constitution and formed an 
autonomous PQlitical community in permanent union 
with the" u.s.45 It seemed Hemaltdez Colon was 
saying Puerto Rico was sovereign and autonomous, 
which are unsustainable conditions since the Island is 
an unincorporated territorial possession of the U .S. 
subject to the U.S. Constitution. The PPD was 
compelled to substitute a statement on the principles 
of commonwealth that expressly acknowledged United 
. p Ri 46 States soveretgnty over uerto co. 
The PPD also sought assurances on Section 936. 
However, U.S. Treasury official Kenneth W. Gideon 
instructed Congress that it "should make clear that tax 
benefits such as section 936 cannot be regarded as 
benefits that will last indefinitely," but as incentives for 
investments subject to Congressional revision.47 
The PPD always chafes with discontent when the U .S. 
applies legislation and regulations that interfere with 
the Commonwealth's management of the local 
economy. In order to limit the scope of federal 
intervention in this area, the PPD requested a partial 
veto of federal statutes. Hernandez Colon requested 
authority to notify Congress as to the inappro-
priateness of U.S.la'WS, with the President being given 
the power to declare such la'WS inapplicable if 
Congress did not issue a specific finding within sixty 
days. This move toward "enhanced autonomy" was 
rejected by the Senate Committee on a variety of 
grounds, including violation of the principle of 
separation of powers. On this issue, S.712 merely 
allo'WS the Commonwealth government to ask 
Congress to reconsider the applicability of federalla'WS 
and establishes a complex legislative procedure that 
extends Congressional oversight into Puerto Rican 
affairs. 
Derailing Independence 
The independence proposals were also systematically 
weakened. The PIP had requested a twenty-five year 
transition period for phasing out Section 936. But the 
U.S. Senate Committee recommended termination of 
the tax benefit upon proclamation of independence. 
The PIP also wanted to establish unrestricted free 
trade between the Republic of Puerto Rico and the 
United States for twenty-four years. The U.S. Senate 
Committee rejected this proposal for preferential 
trade relations. Bill S.712 (Section 305) simply calls 
for a Joint Transition Commission under the 
independence option to develop provisions for 
governing trade relations, merely committing Congress 
to consider negotiating mutual free trade relations. 
To be economically viable, an independent Republic 
of Puerto Rico will require U.S. assistance for an 
extended period. The PIP requested federal block 
grants that amounted to the "aggregate funding of aU 
programs" Puerto Rico currently receives, for a period 
of ten years, followed by a ten-year phase-out. The 
U.S. Senate Committee consented to provide federal 
block grants for a period of nine years, the amount to 
be negotiated by the Joint Transition Commission. but 
estimated at $3.8 billion annually. 
Given these conditions, it seems likely an independent 
Republic of Puerto Rico will experience major 
economic dislocations. With the immediate 
termination of Section 936, such a Republic's capacity 
to retain multinational corporate investments would be 
seriously impaired. For many, the U.S. government 
has, by rejecting the economic proposals in the 
independence option, openly repudiated its obligation 
to provide compensation for ninety-one years of 
colonial administration. H Congress retains the 
economic provisions in S.12, they will doubtlessly 
frustrate efforts by a Republic of Puerto Rico to 
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engineer a gradual transition from a dependent colony 
to viable independent republic. 
In addition, the defense provisions imposed by the 
U.S. Senate Committee undermine the principle of 
sovereignty that was the linchpin of the independence 
proposal. Congress requires specific arrangements for 
the use of military installations and territory that 
would "come into effect simultaneously with the 
proclamation of independence." These include 
unrestricted access to existing military facilities, an 
agreement to deny third countries use of Puerto Rican 
territory for military purposes without U.S. 
authorization, and an agreement that these conditions 
are subject to change only by mutual agreement 
pursuant to specific Congressional legislation. 
Congress has made certification of independence 
contingent on resolving these military preoccupations 
to the satisfaction of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The Colonial Bias 
The revisions to the original S.712, imposed by the 
U.S. Senate Committee and the Bush Administration, 
will decisively influence the referendum results. 
Popular support for the PIP option will be seriously 
impaired if independence is perceived to mean future 
economic deterioration. Similarly, the PPD's prospects 
may have been damaged by its humiliating failure to 
obtain changes to the Puerto Rico Federal Relations 
Act. which would have bestowed a modicum of 
autonomy to the Commonwealth government 
On the other hand, statehood now, more the ever, 
appears to be a realistic option that enjoys support in 
the highest levels of the Bush Administration. Prior 
to the hearings, popular skepticism was widespread 
about U.S. willingness ever to accept Puerto Rico as 
a state. While the doubt still lingers, the Bush 
Administration's open endorsement for statehood and 
the increased federal transfer payments Puerto Rico 
would receive as a state, fortifies the PNP's electoral 
prospects, whether or not the referendum is held. 
The hearings demonstrated the U.S. government's 
resolve to safeguard its security interests and to avoid 
incurring additional financial obligations. S.712 reveals 
that, while the U.S. government symbolically 
acknowledges the right of the Puerto Rican people to 
self-determination. in reality it intends to closely 
regulate the referendum process. Disputes would be 
mediated by the federal courts, the political campaigns 
would be financed by Congress, a referendum 
information officer would be appointed by the 
President of the United States, and United States 
Marshalls will monitor the referendum. 
Given the history of FBI activities against 
independence advocates and socialists, this provision 
has caused alarm among some Puerto Ricans. 
Roberto Roldan-Burgos, General Coordinator of the 
Puerto Rican Institute of Civil Rights, expressed the 
concerns of many independenlistas when he testified 
that 
FBI and U.S. marshalls committed many civil 
rights abuses during the operation of August 30, 
1985, in which the alleged macheteros were 
arrested. It should be ensured that there is no 
such intervention or persecution during this 
referendum process.48 
The entire process resulting in S.712 was carefully 
orchestrated by the U.S. Senate Committee to limit 
discussion to a manageable, self-selected group of 
political elites and policy makers. The political party 
leaders did not hold conventions or meetings of their 
membership to discuss the status options and rules for 
conducting the referendum.49 Substaptive negotiations 
have been, and will continue to be conducted beyond 
the scope of public inquiry and participation. While 
the hearings in Puerto Rico gave the impression of 
open dialogue, this was not a substitute for a 
comprehensive and genuinely open discussion of the 
complex legal and political issues that a status 
referendum entails. Nonetheless, since the hearings 
were televised, they were an important vehicle that 
enlightened the Puerto Rican population about the 
colonial nature of the referendum process. 
It would appear the Puerto Rican Independence Party 
(PIP) has paid a high price in order to participate in 
the referendum. It includes its agreement to relinquish 
Puerto Rico's sovereign right over the use of national 
territory and to negotiate defense and security 
arrangements with allies of its own choosing. In a 
1977 report on decolonization, the Colegio de 
Abogados de Puerto Rico argued that, • ... the 
unconditional maintenance of U.S. military bases in 
Puerto Rico decisively affects the process of self 
determination . .oo The Colegio reaffirmed this position 
in its testimony before the UN Decolonization 
Committee in August 1989. 
By conceding sovereignty over natural territory to the 
U.S., it could be said that the PIP has been an 
accomplice to an act that deprives Puerto Rico of its 
"right to self-tietermination and independence . ..s1 
Even PIP Vice-President Fernando Martin has 
referred to S.712 as a "flagrant breach of the minimal 
norms of international law on decolonization," and 
stated the military provisions "grotesquely" condition 
the independence option.52 Why, then, does the PIP 
continue to participate in the referendum process? 
The PIP says the referendum is "an instrument that 
can create positive conditions for an authentic 
decolonizing process in the future.-63 It is certain the 
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U.S. will not grant Puerto Rico statehood and cites 
the U.S. House of Representatives' rejection of the 
self-executing provision as an indication of this. 
Moreover, Ruben Berrios contends that the 
referendum process has discredited the 
Commonwealth status and eroded the the PPD's 
electoral prospects. He adds that "the plebiscite 
process and the participation of the PIP has led the 
United States--- voluntarily or by accident--- to begin 
to legitimize independencia before the people, giving 
it political credibility and economic viability to those 
Puerto Ricans who are not independenJistas . .64 In the 
first hearing of the House Subcommittee on Insular 
and International Affairs, the PIP also reaffirmed 
Puerto Rico's right to secede under statehood. 
The View of Socialists and other Independentistas 
It is important to realize the PIP does not represent 
all the political tendencies and social movements that 
are calling for Puerto Rico's independence.55 Since 
January 17, 1989, when the three political parties 
called for a consulta, the position of some sectors of 
the independence movement not affiliated with the 
PIP has undergone a gradual transformation. 
The Socialist Reaction 
For many socialists and independenJistas, the hearings 
were clearly a calculated political exercise designed to 
portray the U.S. in a favorable light in the 
decolonization hearings in the United Nations this 
past August In their testimony before the Senate 
Committee, Juan Marl Bras and Carlos Gal lisa (of the 
Puerto Rican Socialist Party), the two major figures in 
the Puerto Rican socialist movement, supported the 
PIP's participation in the referendum process. 
However, each rejected S.712 as an exercise in 
colonial intervention orchestrated by "pro counsels." 
They called for a transfer of sovereign powers to the 
Puerto Rican people as a precondition to conducting 
a legitimate referendum. Marl Bras, president of 
Causa Comun IndependenJista, objected that the U.S. 
Senate Committee arbitrarily stipulated the conditions 
it would accept for each of the status options. 
During an August 12, 1989 march at the United 
Nations organized by pro-independence organizations, 
a diverse group of speakers called for a boycott of the 
"false referendum" and demanded a UN-defined and 
supervised plebiscite under the requirements of 
international law. The conditions for a legitimate 
referendum, according to the organizers, include: 1) 
the prior transfer of all sovereign powers to Puerto 
Rico; 2) the release of all political prisoners prior to 
the transfer of powers; 3) the withdrawal of all U.S. 
troops; 4) the participation in the referendum of all 
Puerto Ricans whether living on the Island or in the 
United States; and 5) U.S. economic reparations 
"necessary for the transition from colonialism to 
independence . .66 
On July 30, 1989, six Puerto Rico-based leftist groups 
publicly rejected the U.S. Senate-devised referendum 
process as unacce.ptable for failing to comply with 
international law.5 But the group did not call for a 
boycott at the time, since it was felt this would divide 
the independence movement and undermine the 
position of the PIP. Rather, they called for grassroots 
organizational work. continuous agitation against 
S.712, and coordinating the activities of anti-colonial 
groupings in order to pressure the United States to 
accept international standards and permit Puerto 
Ricans to undertake a genuine decolonization process. 
Since then, some sectors on the left have spumed the 
PIP for its continued involvement in the referendum 
process. Pensamiento otlico, an important journal of 
leftist political thought in Puerto Rico, criticized the 
PIP for deluding itself into thinking that independence 
could be achieved through the ballot box. They argued 
the PIP is organizationally weakened and increasingly 
divorced from popular and community-based 
movements as a consequence of its referendum 
activities.58 
Conforming to International Law 
During hearings, the U.S. Senate Committee and the 
Bush Administration expressed hostility to the concept 
of transfer of powers, dismissed alternative 
referendum proposals, argued that the proposed 
referendum complied with international law and 
challenged the moral and legal authority of members 
of the UN Committee of 24 to rule on the issue of 
democratic self-determination for the people of Puerto 
Rico. U.S. Senator Johnston has concluded that, 
The United Nations' resolutions may reflect 
international law, but they do not rise to the 
status of international law. International law is a 
body of rules devised over the years, and it is not 
a statut~ group of laws enacted by the United 
Nations. 
Ironically, while the U.S. Senate Committee imposed 
this limitation on the applicability of UN resolutions, 
the U.S. State Department frequently but selectively, 
cites the 1953 UN resolutions (that have since been 
superseded) to document the U.S. position that Puerto 
Rico is not a colony. The U.S. Senate Committee 
ultimately rejected "international monitoring of the 
referendum because Puerto Rico's political status is 
an internal United States matter.-60 For these reasons, 
among others cited above, the current referendum bill 
is seen by proponents of independence, and even PPD 
adherents, as a violation of international law with 
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respect to self-determination for the people of Puerto 
Rico. 
In her testimony at the UN, Colegio President Nora 
Rodriguez Matias observed that, 
The insistence of the United States to retain its 
military installations in Puerto Rico under the 
independence formula is a violation with respect 
to the territorial integrity of the people according 
to resolution 1514(XV) of the United Nations. 
United States insistence in maintaining its military 
installations in Puerto Rico against the will of the 
Puerto Rican people is cause for alarm. 
The Colegio de Abogados de Pueno Rico has issued 
numerous reports during the last twenty-six years on 
various aspects of Puerto Rican-U.S. relations and the 
constitutional status of the Puerto Rican people. It 
has consistently called for the implementation of a 
decolonization process that conforms to international 
taw. 
In the U.S. Senate hearings held in San Juan, 
Rodriguez Matias criticized S.712 because in 
redefining each of status options, the Senate 
Committee violated the principles of 
self-determination. She called for a new bill that 
would include the following provisions: 1) that each 
status option provide for the sovereignty of the Puerto 
Rican people; 2) that the U.S. renounce the power 
and authority it exercises over Puerto Rico; 3) that 
the U.S. unconditionally transfer these powers to the 
Puerto Rican people; 4) that the decolonization 
process be free of pressure and interference, including 
removal of military forces, to permit equal 
participation by all sectors; and -t2 that the United 
Nations supervise the referendum. 1 
PR0-ELA, a self-declared non-partisan organization 
that promotes autonomy for Puerto Rico, testified, 
• ... if the referendum is held outside the norms of 
international law ... [it] should be condemned by the 
[UN] Committee as yet another attempt to circumvent 
the inalienable ri~t of the Puerto Rican people to 
self-determination.& The socialist and independence 
representatives similarly denounced the palpably 
colonial elements of the U.S. Senate Committee bill. 
The United States did, however, score an important 
victory at the UN. Puerto Rican independence 
advocates were certain that more UN Committee of 
24 members would endorse a Cuban draft resolution 
on the decolonization of Puerto Rico than in previous 
years.63 Venezuela was expected to cast the decisive 
vote that would have set the context for a possible 
ratification of the resolution when it would be brought 
before the Committee of 24 again in 1990. However, 
in a demonstration of the significance the United 
States truly attaches to the UN hearings, it appears 
that Venezuela bowed to pressure from Washington 
and abstained from voting. Independence forces were 
dismayed at Venezuela's decision to do so on the 
grounds that it would be premature for the UN 
Committee of 24 to declare Puerto Rico a colony, 
given the ongoing referendum process.64 
According to Freddy Munoz, General Secretary of the 
Venezuela Socialist Movement, "the first reason to 
consider for the abstention was that the United States 
and Governor Hernandez pressured Venezuela . .as 
This recent incident suggests the United States is still 
compelled to exert its diplomatic weight to combat 
growing international pressure to declare Puerto Rico 
a colony and thus be forced to relinquish its 
sovereignty over the Istand.66 
The Consequences to Date 
The referendum process has been an event of vital 
consequence for the independence movement in 
Puerto Rico. It has rekindled a debate that has been 
dormant and has unified diverse political tendencies in 
opposing colonial rule. Popular reaction against the 
referendum increased and support for independence 
has widened, as attested to by the unpreceden!ed 
anti-colonial march of 70,000 to 80,000 puertorriquenos 
in San Juan on June 17, 1989 during the U.S. Senate 
hearings. Because of its role in the referendum 
process thus far, the Partido Independentista 
Puertorriqueno appears to have gained prestige as a 
pragmatic political organization, whose leadership is 
sophisticated and able to negotiate effectively with 
Washington. 
Domestically, the ongoing status debate has reinforced 
the sense of cultural identity and historical resonance 
of the U.S.-resident Puerto Rican population. Ignored 
and systematically marginalized, Puerto Ricans have 
attained a new political visibility. Puerto Ricans in 
the United States have demonstrated their keen 
interest in developments on the Island and are 
demanding that their voices be heard on matters 
pertaining to the future of Puerto Rico. The Puerto 
Rican political leadership on the Island has been 
forced to contend with the reality that they must 
acknowledge the important role of the exile Puerto 
Rican population in any process that may lead to a 
redefinition of Puerto Rico's political status. 
In recognition of this reality, the U.S. House 
Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs 
recently announced plans to hold a hearing on June 8, 
1990 in New York City in East Harlem (El Barrio). 
According to the press release announcing this 
hearing. 
... de Lugo (Chair of the subcommittee) pointed 
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out that, contrary to a published report in San 
Juan, Congress has not "dismissed" a proposal for 
Puerto Ricans in the United States to vote in the 
referendum. The issue has not been addressed 
yet.67 
Despite these important political and social 
by-products, many Puerto Ricans on the Island feel 
that the status debate has resulted in a lamentable 
consumption of political resources and intellectual 
talent that could be better used to address the 
deplorable human conditions on the Island. The 
maladies that afflict Puerto Rico are many, ranging 
from grinding poverty for large sectors of the 
population to an impending ecological disaster, from 
incompetent and ineffective government agencies to 
the serious deterioration of social institutions. 
For these Puerto Ricans, the status debate has 
distracted attention from the genuinely critical issues 
that threaten the decomposition of society and it has 
absolved the government and political leadership from 
responsibly addressing these matters. Moreover, they 
point out that important victories in civil rights, 
working conditions, housing, environmental protection, 
and other critical areas, have been achieved through 
political organizing and struggle, and not through the 
ballot box. Whether the crisis that confronts Puerto 
Rican society is a function of colonialism, symptomatic 
of a wider process of social and ecological dete-
rioration typical of modem societies, or a combination 
of both, is of secondary concern for this sector of the 
Puerto Rican people. What is in doubt is the 
seriousness of the United States claim to be willing to 
relinquish its colonial grasp over Puerto Rico. 
These concerns are particularly relevant since there is 
a growing realization that it is doubtful the 
referendum will be held, given Congressional 
degradation of the status formulas and the feuding 
between U .S. Senate and House Committees over the 
final version of bill.68 But if it is held according to the 
conditions set by S.712, it appears that one or more of 
the three parties will boycott the referendum, thus 
discrediting the outcome. 
A referendum that fails to respect the principle of 
self-determination will lack any legitimacy and 
undoubtedly fail to resolve the Island's colonial status. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. will no doubt attempt to portray 
the results in the international arena as a free and 
binding decision by the Puerto Rican people in sup-
port of either annexation or colonialism. Doubtless, 
the issue of Puerto Rico will continue before the 
UN.In this context, given the intensity of Puerto Rican 
nationalism that crosses all party lines, the U.S. 
government might ponder Carlos Gallisa's alarm: 
lf ... you insist on asserting the colonial rule or in 
forcefeeding us the culmination of that rule which 
is statehood, you would find yourselves not with 
a 51st state, but with a Northern Ireland within 
your confederation.o09 
The unanswered question is whether the U.S. 
government is willing to orchestrate a charade that 
leaves unresolved the very problems that have 
compelled it to address the crisis of colonialism in the 
first place. The dilemma of whether to participate in 
the referendum or to repudiate it as an exercise in 
imperial manipulation is under intense debate within 
the independence movement. Some within the 
movement see independence as a historical 
inevitability and define their task as one of pressing 
the U .S. government to recognize the existence of the 
Puerto Rican nation and to accept the impossibility of 
harmoniously integrating the Island and its people into 
the metropolis. In the long term, it may be in the best 
interests of the U .S. government to devise a 
decolonization process that truly respects the 
principles of self-determination for Puerto Rico. • 
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